On Brezhnev Nuking Kissinger’s House and Giving Him Cookies

Posted on February 8, 2012 by Nick Blackbourn

Last week at the Ford Presidential Library I came across some fun memos and documents. Transcriptions of official government meetings often begin with ‘[Preceded by small talk.]‘ But when this ‘small talk’ is included it can be quite interesting, and is sometimes pretty funny.

If nothing else, it reminds us that beyond the nuclear stand-off and ideological confrontation, people were dealing with people. Delegations shared jokes and got to know each other. It was an aspect of Cold War diplomacy that is easy to overlook.

I enjoyed reading the ‘small talk’ whenever possible, and here is one of my favourites; a conversation between Henry Kissinger and Leonid Brezhnev on January 22, 1976, in The Kremlin.

Brezhnev: Maybe we could proceed a little faster today.
Kissinger: All right.
Brezhnev: Here is a match. [He lights a match and makes a motion to ignite all his talking papers.]
Kissinger: I thought you were going to bring out your cannon.
Brezhnev: There is a cannon in my office?
Kissinger: You threatened me with it last time.
Brezhnev: As long as America threatens us, we have to threaten America. We now have MIRVed warheads on that cannon. And one is aimed at your house.
Kissinger: I’d better get my dog out of there. [Laughter]
Brezhnev: [Looks through his papers] You have an enormous number of forces. Horrors! I can’t imagine where you get them all. And so many in Europe.
Kissinger: If your generals count like our generals Mr. General Secretary, there will be an amazing computation.
…
Brezhnev: Earlier Dr. Kissinger said he was afraid of me. I want to say I’m afraid of him. So I guess I’d better give him more of these cookies, to make him kinder. [He passes over a plate of snacks.]

Online Social Networking and the Historian

Posted on January 25, 2012 by Nick Blackbourn

I was on a panel last night presenting some ideas on online social networking for historians. Here is a summary:

I don’t see myself as an expert, but I also think that no-one can be. Social media tools are just that, tools. They can be used in different ways to different ends by different users. That is the strength of all these platforms. I was asked how my online involvement had benefitted me as an academic. Clearly, the relevance of online social networking to the history profession was not apparent to everyone, but I hope I explained why it most certainly is.

Building networks and creating communities can only help the historian. Twitter, for example, doesn’t have to be – and shouldn’t be – a discussion on what you had for lunch. There is already a community of historians who are happy to connect and help each other. I’ve discussed research methodologies, shared links, been sent relevant research material, and vented through twitter. In essence, I’ve collaborated with other historians online, and that’s important. I’m also certain this level of collaboration will increase with time and as my own understanding of what can be done online improves.

My own journey was a long one, perhaps stereotypical. I joined. I watched. I dabbled. I participated. I’m now all in. It’s clear, as with most things in life, that the more you put in the more you get out.

I look forward to more and more historians taking the plunge and building their online communities. Historians have a lot to offer not just each other, but a much wider audience. Getting online and participating in communities is something every historian should be doing to share their skills and expertise. Good things will happen. It’s not something that might be worth doing in the future, it’s something to do right now.

Historians of the world unite (online)!

‘Visualising’ SALT II: Debating Nuclear Arms Control with Images

Posted on January 19, 2012 by Nick Blackbourn

The ‘SALT II Debate’, the argument over the ratification of a nuclear arms control treaty in the late-1970s, was fought with passion on both sides. While the ‘pro-treaty’ postion maintained that any control was better than none, the ‘anti-treaty’ stance was that a sub-optimal deal was simply not worth signing.

The treaty debate was highly abstract. Disagreements centered around throw-weight, circular-area-probable, MIRVing, SLCMs, GLCMs; all terms that meant little to anyone outside of the small number of people that actually thought about these issues.

While both sides in the debate thought that ‘reason’ would ultimtaely lead their position to victory over ratification, the need to make the argument accessible often resulted in sloganeering and over-simplification, sometimes in imagery.

I found the poster here in the Committee on the Present Danger Papers at the Hoover Institution. It was produced by the American Security Council and was included in materials they distributed, which opposed ratification of the SALT II treaty.

The image contrasts the few, white weapons of the American arsenal, with the numerous, large, dark missiles of the Soviets. The implication is that the Soviet weapons are plentiful and menacing in contrast to their U.S. counterparts. The ASC argument – and also the Committee on the Present Danger’s – was that SALT II should be opposed because the American strategic arsenal needed to be larger in number and in size to match the Soviet force.

Whatever we think about the SALT II debate – whether the treaty should or should not have been ratified – the simplistic notion that more and larger missile-types were needed was disingenuous. Many Soviet missiles were bigger for two important reasons. Firstly, because the Soviet advantage was making big missiles with big warheads, the ‘upgrading’ of forces generally meant making their missiles capable of carrying a larger warhead with greater destructive power. Secondly, because circuitry technology was inferior, meaning guidance systems were less accurate, Soviet nuclear weapons needed to be more destructive to account for the fact that they were less likely to land near their hardened target.

This poster, then, actually depicts American parity, if not superiority. More accurate American weapons could be smaller as a less destructive warhead was required. The U.S. had fewer missile variants because it retired its obsolete models; a more cost efficient method than continually adding to the missile-stock. (This was often characterised as ‘unilateral disarmament’ by SALT II critics.)

Imagery often requires interpretation to have meaning and it was not provided with this American Security Council poster.

Further Reading: Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt II (1980)

Soviet Peace Posters in the 1980s

Posted on January 16, 2012 by Nick Blackbourn

http://www.retronaut.co/2012/01/soviet-peace-with-the-usa-posters-1980s/

After gaining power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev desperately attempted to reform the Soviet Union intending to end chronic economic under-performance.

I like this poster series (featured on the Retronaut website) because it provides a visual dimension to this effort towards change and reform. The poster I’ve featured particularly interests me as it clearly demonstrates the linkage that Gorbachev stressed between disarmament and a better future. Fewer missiles will mean more trees: a simple message.

This was part of the attempt of the Reformers to demilitarise Soviet society. Previously, the threat from the West had been stressed to justify and maintain support for high military expenditure. Gorbachev undertook a kind of ‘deprogramming’ effort to reorientate the ‘East vs. West’ conflict away from confrontation and towards a ‘normalisation’ of relations intending to give the Soviet Union space to reform.

Further Reading: Kotkin, S., ‘Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, (OUP: New York, 2008).
Find in a library or, Buy from Amazon

Ronald Reagan and the End of the Cold War

Posted on January 13, 2012 by Nick Blackbourn

Dealing with scholarship on Ronald Reagan can be difficult. Using just book titles, it is often a challenge to differentiate between serious attempts to understand the administration of the 40th President and efforts that simply bask in his glory. I’ve fallen into the trap before, but I recently tried James Mann’s ‘The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan‘ and it most definitely fits into the former category.

Grappling with the ‘triumphalist’ paradigm, Mann’s book recognises Reagan’s ‘crucial role’, even if ‘Gorbachev played the leading role’ [1]. The U.S. President buttressed Gorbachev’s position, facilitating the progressive reforms that would ultimately lead to the end of the Cold War. Reagan’s contributions were important, and he should be credited for his role, but Gorbachev’s actions were vital.

That is the overall argument of ‘Rebellion‘. But I was most interested in Mann’s analysis of Reagan’s changing attitude towards the Soviet Union. The Committee on the Present Danger was extremely proud to count Reagan among its membership prior to 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan certainly appears to have been an enthusiastic supporter; fully 32 Committee on the Present Danger officials joined the new administration [2]. However, within a few short years a number of these figures had left, including Committee on the Present Danger Executive Board Members, Richard Pipes and Eugene Rostow. Reagan had moved on.

The message of the Committee on the Present Danger in the late 1970s, I would argue, encapsulated a moment in U.S. history; the fear of U.S. decline and of Soviet ascendency. But, contrary to Committee plans, this fear would not rebuild the anti-Communist consensus of the late 1940s. Reagan began to understand that this represented a static view of the world. The universal truth of ‘freedom’ in which he believed meant he could look beyond Soviet totalitarianism. He really meant it when he spoke of Communism as ‘a sad and bizarre chapter in human history’, and he was eager to help turn the page [3].

The ‘Rebellion’ in Mann’s title, therefore, refers to Reagan’s disagreement with ‘traditional’ conservatives. As President he could perceive that change was not simply desirable, but actually possible. The Committee on the Present Danger, as just one example, was too dogmatic to appreciate that Gorbachev’s Soviet Union was evolving, so focused was it on the ‘Strategic Balance’.

Reagan, in this account, deserves praise. Mann does not commit himself in the debate on whether Reagan had a clear vision, or instead acted on ‘crafty instinct’, but argues that it hardly matters [4]. The traditional conservative view in the late-1980′s was clearly resistant to Reagan’s conciliatory approach, but it was exactly this approach that allowed Gorbachev to take the reform path.

True to form, the Committee on the Present Danger, as late as the early 1990s, continued to label the Soviet Union as America’s greatest threat and advised against conciliation. Not because of ‘loose nukes’, but because its military was still capable of invading Western Europe.

For whatever reason, Reagan was able to transcend this type of traditional Cold War thinking. Groups including the Committee on the Present Danger could not, or did not want to, make this shift. Reagan deserves credit for his ability to look beyond the stereotype of the Soviet Bear, even if, as Mann concludes, it does not make him the pivotal figure in the end of the Cold War.

[1] Mann, J., ‘A History of the End of the Cold War: The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan‘, (Penguin Books: New York, 2010), p. 346
[2] The Committee on the Present Danger, ‘The Fifth Year and the New Administration‘, 1980, in the Hoover Archives, CPD Papers, Box 177
[3] ‘Ronald Reagan: In His Own Words‘, BBC News, 06-06-2004, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3780871.stm], accessed 13-01-2012
[4] Mann, ‘Rebellion of Ronald Reagan‘, p.342