nick blackbourn

The ‘SALT II Debate’, the argument over the ratification of a nuclear arms control treaty in the late-1970s, was fought with passion on both sides. While the ‘pro-treaty’ postion maintained that any control was better than none, the ‘anti-treaty’ stance was that a sub-optimal deal was simply not worth signing.

The treaty debate was highly abstract. Disagreements centered around throw-weight, circular-area-probable, MIRVing, SLCMs, GLCMs; all terms that meant little to anyone outside of the small number of people that actually thought about these issues.

While both sides in the debate thought that ‘reason’ would ultimtaely lead their position to victory over ratification, the need to make the argument accessible often resulted in sloganeering and over-simplification, sometimes in imagery.

I found the poster here in the Committee on the Present Danger Papers at the Hoover Institution. It was produced by the American Security Council and was included in materials they distributed, which opposed ratification of the SALT II treaty.

The image contrasts the few, white weapons of the American arsenal, with the numerous, large, dark missiles of the Soviets. The implication is that the Soviet weapons are plentiful and menacing in contrast to their U.S. counterparts. The ASC argument – and also the Committee on the Present Danger’s – was that SALT II should be opposed because the American strategic arsenal needed to be larger in number and in size to match the Soviet force.

Whatever we think about the SALT II debate – whether the treaty should or should not have been ratified – the simplistic notion that more and larger missile-types were needed was disingenuous. Many Soviet missiles were bigger for two important reasons. Firstly, because the Soviet advantage was making big missiles with big warheads, the ‘upgrading’ of forces generally meant making their missiles capable of carrying a larger warhead with greater destructive power. Secondly, because circuitry technology was inferior, meaning guidance systems were less accurate, Soviet nuclear weapons needed to be more destructive to account for the fact that they were less likely to land near their hardened target.

This poster, then, actually depicts American parity, if not superiority. More accurate American weapons could be smaller as a less destructive warhead was required. The U.S. had fewer missile variants because it retired its obsolete models; a more cost efficient method than continually adding to the missile-stock. (This was often characterised as ‘unilateral disarmament’ by SALT II critics.)

Imagery often requires interpretation to have meaning and it was not provided with this American Security Council poster.

Further Reading: Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt II (1980)

http://www.retronaut.co/2012/01/soviet-peace-with-the-usa-posters-1980s/

After gaining power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev desperately attempted to reform the Soviet Union intending to end chronic economic under-performance.

I like this poster series (featured on the Retronaut website) because it provides a visual dimension to this effort towards change and reform. The poster I’ve featured particularly interests me as it clearly demonstrates the linkage that Gorbachev stressed between disarmament and a better future. Fewer missiles will mean more trees: a simple message.

This was part of the attempt of the Reformers to demilitarise Soviet society. Previously, the threat from the West had been stressed to justify and maintain support for high military expenditure. Gorbachev undertook a kind of ‘deprogramming’ effort to reorientate the ‘East vs. West’ conflict away from confrontation and towards a ‘normalisation’ of relations intending to give the Soviet Union space to reform.

Further Reading: Kotkin, S., ‘Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, (OUP: New York, 2008).
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Dealing with scholarship on Ronald Reagan can be difficult. Using just book titles, it is often a challenge to differentiate between serious attempts to understand the administration of the 40th President and efforts that simply bask in his glory. I’ve fallen into the trap before, but I recently tried James Mann’s ‘The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan‘ and it most definitely fits into the former category.

Grappling with the ‘triumphalist’ paradigm, Mann’s book recognises Reagan’s ‘crucial role’, even if ‘Gorbachev played the leading role’ [1]. The U.S. President buttressed Gorbachev’s position, facilitating the progressive reforms that would ultimately lead to the end of the Cold War. Reagan’s contributions were important, and he should be credited for his role, but Gorbachev’s actions were vital.

That is the overall argument of ‘Rebellion‘. But I was most interested in Mann’s analysis of Reagan’s changing attitude towards the Soviet Union. The Committee on the Present Danger was extremely proud to count Reagan among its membership prior to 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan certainly appears to have been an enthusiastic supporter; fully 32 Committee on the Present Danger officials joined the new administration [2]. However, within a few short years a number of these figures had left, including Committee on the Present Danger Executive Board Members, Richard Pipes and Eugene Rostow. Reagan had moved on.

The message of the Committee on the Present Danger in the late 1970s, I would argue, encapsulated a moment in U.S. history; the fear of U.S. decline and of Soviet ascendency. But, contrary to Committee plans, this fear would not rebuild the anti-Communist consensus of the late 1940s. Reagan began to understand that this represented a static view of the world. The universal truth of ‘freedom’ in which he believed meant he could look beyond Soviet totalitarianism. He really meant it when he spoke of Communism as ‘a sad and bizarre chapter in human history’, and he was eager to help turn the page [3].

The ‘Rebellion’ in Mann’s title, therefore, refers to Reagan’s disagreement with ‘traditional’ conservatives. As President he could perceive that change was not simply desirable, but actually possible. The Committee on the Present Danger, as just one example, was too dogmatic to appreciate that Gorbachev’s Soviet Union was evolving, so focused was it on the ‘Strategic Balance’.

Reagan, in this account, deserves praise. Mann does not commit himself in the debate on whether Reagan had a clear vision, or instead acted on ‘crafty instinct’, but argues that it hardly matters [4]. The traditional conservative view in the late-1980′s was clearly resistant to Reagan’s conciliatory approach, but it was exactly this approach that allowed Gorbachev to take the reform path.

True to form, the Committee on the Present Danger, as late as the early 1990s, continued to label the Soviet Union as America’s greatest threat and advised against conciliation. Not because of ‘loose nukes’, but because its military was still capable of invading Western Europe.

For whatever reason, Reagan was able to transcend this type of traditional Cold War thinking. Groups including the Committee on the Present Danger could not, or did not want to, make this shift. Reagan deserves credit for his ability to look beyond the stereotype of the Soviet Bear, even if, as Mann concludes, it does not make him the pivotal figure in the end of the Cold War.

[1] Mann, J., ‘A History of the End of the Cold War: The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan‘, (Penguin Books: New York, 2010), p. 346
[2] The Committee on the Present Danger, ‘The Fifth Year and the New Administration‘, 1980, in the Hoover Archives, CPD Papers, Box 177
[3] ‘Ronald Reagan: In His Own Words‘, BBC News, 06-06-2004, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3780871.stm], accessed 13-01-2012
[4] Mann, ‘Rebellion of Ronald Reagan‘, p.342

So, after attending THATCamp at AHA 2012, I’m fully convinced of the need to blog. Thanks to Dan Cohen for that, I needed a guilt-trip-as-impetus.

Why blog?

Mostly because there’s little reason not to. Who doesn’t want their research to reach a wider audience? Why wouldn’t an academic want to share their ideas, get feedback, and hone writing skills? My two take-away pieces of advice from Dan Cohen’s ‘Intro to Blogging’ workshop: make choices on style and content, and stick to them. I’ll try.

Posts will appear on Cold War history – quite a bit on the Committee on the Present Danger I expect – and on ‘doing’ history as a PhD candidate.

I don’t promise to blog daily or even weekly, but I will write posts when they need to be written!

In the words of WordPress; ‘Hello World.’

Time on the road is precious. I’m hoping to get through as much archival material as possible so I’m taking the ‘lightening tour’ approach to research; if in doubt, take a picture.

Thankfully the Hoover Institution now allows cameras in the reading room and I’m taking my trusty 5mp digital camera on my upcoming trip. It has a ‘micro’ setting, for close-in photos, and an auto-stabiliser function. I’ve splashed out on an AC adaptor, which means no switching between batteries all day. A 2gb SD disc should be enough for one day of snaps before processing in the evening.

The key to this system is a ‘table-top monopod‘. It attaches to the camera and clamps to the desktop, which should ensure a sharp image for each shot. Once the shot has been set up once, it will stay in place ready for the next document.

The idea is to then take a picture of *anything* that might be interesting. I can read the document when I get home; it’s quicker to just take the photo. For each new file and box, I’ll take a picture of a note with the correct details for what is to be pictured next.

The Image Capture software on my Mac is easiest for importing the picture collection into a pre-prepared file system. Image Capture features the camera’s time stamp for each photo taken, which means you can be sure the order of the photographed material won’t be muddled up.

After two-weeks of following this method, I’ll have created a comprehensive digitised database and be able to process my collection at my leisure.